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ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING: A CASE
STUDY IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Joseph P. Tomaint
Understanding the electric power industry can at times be overwhelming
given the amount of information, technical jargon, economic forecasts, and
detail involved with such a complex field. Indeed, the recent history of the
industry has been a series of regulatory battles. A decade or two ago, such
concepts as CWIP, AFUDC, plant cancellations, and rate shock led to qualify-
ing facilities, DSM, and increasing customer demand, only to give way to mega
NOPR's, wheeling, restructuring, and stranded costs, as examples of the most
current battlefields.
I imagine that each battle can seem like an all-or-nothing fight and that
practitioners, clients, regulators, and scholars would like to see some conclusion
to these battles. I would also hope for some respite from the day-to-day contro-
versies in order to experience some semblance of regulatory stability, a time to
satisfy regulatory requirements and to plan for the future. Yet, just as the regu-
latory environment seems to stabilize, there is a dramatic shift in the economic
environment. In short, the restructuring of the electric industry through deregu-
lation promises more competition and with it lower prices and more profits.
However, the new competitive environment will come only after experiencing a
transitional period that will keep government regulators and private industry
actors quite busy.' Indeed, it is precisely the alternation between political and
economic forces that precludes regulatory stability. The curious thing over these
last two decades or more is that a respite has not come. Nor does relief from
significant changes in the near future seem likely.
For the sanguine (or the cynical), the more regulatory or deregulatory
initiatives the better because the industry needs the regulatory services of law-
t Dean and Nippert Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. A.B. University of
Notre Dame; J.D. The National Law Center, George Washington University.
1. See, e-g., LEONARD S. HYMAN, AMERICA'S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 363-
65 (6th ed. 1997). Hyman writes that during the transition regulators will continue to monitor distribution and
transmission monopolies; address social issues such as subsidizing lower income consumers and protecting the
environment; help the transition from monopoly to competition; maintain reliability and efficiency; redefine
the service obligations; review old legislation, most notably the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978; and close down the old regulatory system.
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yers and other consultants. For the less sanguine (or the less cynical), there is a
desire for some stillness in this ongoing change in the regulation of the electric
power industry.
It is the intent of this article to provide some relief through a brief regula-
tory history of the electric industry. This history will shine some light on the
path that the industry has traveled over the last century and is likely to travel
for the next generation. The broader purpose of the article is to explain the life
cycle of government regulation of any industry using the electricity industry as
a case study.2 This story demonstrates that industries go through a cycle from
competition through regulation and back to competition. Hopefully, by under-
standing this cycle both the regulatory history and the future of the electric
industry will be more comprehensible. While the demands of day-to-day indus-
try regulation cannot be greatly lessened, at least they can be understood and
placed into a broader context.
I. INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT REGULATION
The United States is a capitalist democracy. Stripped down to its bare
essentials, in such a polity, we believe that the market is a desirable form of
social ordering. Put less prosaically, when markets function well, economic and
political values are promoted. On the economic side, economic efficiency,
wealth creation and technological innovation are fostered. On the political side,
liberty and equality are enhanced as individual choice is maximized and as
every vote (dollar) in the market place is treated equally Consequently, it
should not be surprising that as a matter of government policy, workably com-
petitive markets are attractive and favored. Achieving workably competitive
markets, however, is not preordained. In fact, some markets have impediments
or imperfections which prevent competition and prevent those markets from
achieving the economic and political goals mentioned above. Faced with market
failures, government regulation is an attempt to remove such imperfections and
to promote competition, and, in some instances, the explicit purpose of govern-
ment regulation is to promote better distribution.4 Government regulation, as
we are all too familiar, is a human endeavor with imperfections of its own and
it too can result in regulatory failure.5 Government regulation fails when it does
2. MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); SIDNEY A.
SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY ch. 2 (1993); see also Joseph P. Tomain &
Sidney A. Shapiro, Analyzing Government Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 377 (1997).
3. These claims are intentionally descriptive of the virtues of a competitive market. A basic assumption
of the microeconomic model is that the initial distribution of wealth is acceptable, consequently no claims are
made about distributive fairness at this point. The reality, of course, is that distributive fairness is important
and distributive issues are a part of government regulation. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. ToMAIN,
REGULATORY LAW & POLICY ch. 2 (1993); ROBERT KUTrNER, EVERYTHINO FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND
LIMITS OF MARKETS ch. 1 (1997).
4. See id.; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997).
5. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); PHILIP K. HOWARD,
THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAw IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994). But see Joseph P. Tomain,
Simple Rules for the Regulatory State, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 409 (1996) (review of RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE
[Vol. 33:827
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not correct the market imperfection it intended to fix (i.e. regulatory costs are
greater than projected benefits), when non-market goals are not satisfied (e.g.
the desired redistribution is not achieved), or when the political climate changes
(such as a change in presidential administrations). At this point of regulatory
failure, existing regulations must be replaced by regulatory reform or deregula-
tion.6 In the case of complete deregulation, an industry is back operating in the
market.
Thus, the life cycle of a regulated industry is such that an industry can: (1)
operate in a market until (2) a market imperfection is identified which is (3)
corrected by government regulation until (4) there is regulatory failure which is
responded to either by (5) regulatory reform or (6) total deregulation placing an
industry back in the hands of the market. The history of the electric power
industry is instructive because the industry has gone through each of these
stages and is currently in the throes of stages (5) and (6). The regulatory history
below explains the different stages of the life cycle of the electric industry and
suggests what the future holds.
II. REGULATORY HISTORY7
By way of a preview, note, following Arthur Schlesinger, Sr.,' that in
roughly every generation there is a major structural shift in our political econo-
my between periods favorable to those opposed to government activity? So too
we find similar shifts in every generation in the history of the electric industry
and its regulation. The electric industry has gone from an unregulated competi-
tive market to market failure and then to a system of strong, traditional govern-
ment regulation. After a period, that traditional regulation itself failed, leaving
the industry shaken and susceptible to regulatory reform and conversion to its
current state of deregulation or restructuring. The question then is: What will
the industry look like in the future? Will the industry restructure and function
with another form of regulation? Or will the industry deregulate and thus start
the cycle over again?
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD(1995)).
6. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION
(1993); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE
(1990).
7. See Peter C. Christensen, Overview of Electricity Generation and the Industry, in THE ELECTRIC
INDUSTRY: OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPACTS FOR RESOURCE PRODUCERS, POWER GENERATORS, MARKETERS,
AND CONSUMERS (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 1996) [hereinafter THE ELECTRIc INDUSTRY].
See also Judith M. Matlock, Federal Regulation and Wholesale Wheeling in THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; JAN G.
LAnTOS & JOSEPH P. ToMAIN, ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1992); SHAPIRO &
TOMAIN, supra note 2; HYMAN, supra note 1; TECHNOLOGY FUTURES, INC. & SCIENTIFIC FORESIGHT, INC.,
PRINCIPLES FOR ELECTRIC POWER POLICY (1984).
8. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY ch. 2 (1986).
9. See also SHAPIRO & TOMAiN, supra note 2, ch. 2.
1998]
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A. Competition 1882-1920
On September 4, 1882, Thomas Edison flipped a switch and the first elec-
tric generation and transmission project in the country went into operation on
Pearl Street in New York City. The Pearl Street Station allowed 85 consumers
to light their homes with 400 incandescent lamps rather than by natural or coal
gases.'0 This cleaner, safer lighting innovation was very popular. Like any
start-up industry with a promising technology, competition was vigorous and by
1922, there were 3,774 privately owned electric utilities." In the early stages
of the industry, power stations were constrained by existing technologies and
did not exceed 10 MW. With increasing demand for the product, producers
entered the market and the market contained a multiplicity of electricity genera-
tion and distribution stations. Thus, duplication was inevitable. With that dupli-
cation came technical problems of incompatibility and reliability, which posed a
challenge for the industry and spurred further innovation.
A finn faced with growing demand and vigorous competition naturally
tends to seek greater market share through technological innovation, corporate
restructuring, or both. The electric industry did both as fimns vertically integrat-
ed and expanded generation and distribution capacity in order to capture econo-
mies of scale and a greater share of the market. The larger firms built genera-
tors, ground conductors, electric fixtures, and even light bulbs. In Edison's own
case several companies merged to become the General Electric Company. 2
With such vigorous competition in a technologically advancing industry, it
was not unlikely that economies of scale would be realized and that concentra-
tion would occur.
B. Concentration: 1920-1935
Firms realized that they could achieve economies of scale and capture
market share. From 1922 to 1927, over 1600 privately-owned electric systems
were eliminated as the industry concentrated. 3 Further, as generation and
transmission capacities increased, so did consolidation, and entrepreneurs like
Samuel Insull and Henry Villard created holding companies to hasten consolida-
tion so that by the mid-1920's, 16 holding companies controlled 85 percent of
the nation's electric industry. 4 These holding companies helped advance the
capture of scale economies but at a real cost to consumers. The electric trusts,
like the oil trusts before them, were susceptible to stock manipulation and
shareholder abuses. 5 And, as did with the oil industry, the public reacted
sharply to the electricity trusts and the electricity industry came under scrutiny
10. HYMAN, supra note 1, at 85.
11. Christensen, supra note 7, at 1-2.
12. TECHNOLOGY FUTURES, INC. & SCIENTIFIC FORESIGHT INC., supra note 7, at 231.
13. Christensen, supra note 7, at 1-2.
14. Id. at 1-4; See also MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURrriEs REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 149 (1970);
DOUGLAS W. HAWES, UTrrY HOLDING COMPANIES § 2.03 (1987).
15. HAWES, supra note 14, § 2.05.
[Vol. 33:827
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by state and federal politicians.
At the state level, politicians were drawn to retail ratesetting in order to
protect consumers,16 and at the federal level politicians were drawn to curbing
trust abuses and making electric service universally available. 7
C. Regulation: 1935-1965
The specific legislative reaction to the abuse of trusts was the Public Utili-
ty Holding Company Act of 1935 ("PUHCA").8 Expansion of service was
addressed specifically through hydroelectric power with the passage of the
Federal Power Act Part I in 1920.19
Fundamentally, PUHCA is a registration act requiring holding companies
whose subsidiaries are engaged in either the electric utility business or in the
business of the retail distribution of natural gas to register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. A holding company is defined as a company that
controls, directly or indirectly, ten percent or more of the voting securities of a
public utility.
Under the Act, the SEC was authorized to examine the corporate and oper-
ational structures of the holding company to simplify and integrate operations
for the purpose of avoiding shareholder abuses. The SEC also has the authority
to order divestiture where operations of utility and non-utility operations pose
the potential for financial abuse.e
In addition, 1935 saw the passage of Part II of the Federal Power Ace' to
regulate interstate wholesales of electric power, thus closing what had come to
be known as the Attleboro Gap 2 in the regulation of electricity. Attleboro held
that states were precluded from regulating the interstate sales of electricity and
were limited to retail sales. Part II of the FPA gave what was then known as
the Federal Power Commission the authority to regulate those interstate sales.
In other words, the heart of the national electric industry, generation and trans-
mission, came under federal power.
The intellectual backbone of federal regulation of the electric industry, as
with the regulation of the natural gas industry three years later, was twofold.'
First, electricity was a product that was deemed to be in the public interest and
was highly desirable as a consumer product. The idea that the federal govern-
ment should promote consumption was a dramatic shift in economic thinking
16. HYMAN, supra note 1, ch. 17.
17. A dramatic discussion of the expanse of electricity occurs in the first volume of Robert Caro's pow-
erful biography of Lyndon Johnson as he explains how electricity moved to the Texas hill country. ROBERT
A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER, ch. 28 (1982); See Ronald D. Jones, et al.,
Electricity, in 2 ENERGY LAW & TRANSACTIONS §§52.01-.03 (David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel eds.,
1997).
18. Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1994).
19. Federal Power Act, Part I, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823b (1994).
20. HAWES, supra note 14, § 3.02-.03.
21. Federal Power Act, Part 11, 16 U.s.C. §§ 824-824m (1994).
22. Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
23. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §717 (1994).
19981
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which surrounded the New Deal. Prior to the New Deal laissez-faire reigned, as
courts, most notably the United States Supreme Court,' maintained a hands-
off stance towards government. The New Deal dramatically changed that
stanceI and was based upon the idea that government had a role to play, not
only of national economic stability, but of positive growth and product con-
sumption. Thus government began playing an active role in promoting the
use and development of certain products. The promotion of growth of the elec-
tric industry and the consumption of that product became central to the New
Deal regulatory program.
The second idea that drove electricity regulation was based on the econom-
ic notion that utilities had characteristics of a natural monopoly. Simply put,
natural monopoly theory holds that one firn can more efficiently deliver a
product at a lower cost than multiple frmns.27 Multiple firms cause unnecessary
duplication, such as constructing multiple transmission and distribution systems.
This duplication is wasteful and therefore it is better to promote one firm than
to have wasteful competition from a multiplicity of firms. In such a market,
government regulation is necessary. If unchecked, the strongest natural monopo-
ly firm will consolidate until it has monopoly market power and can visit the
sins of monopoly on consumers.'
Given the desire to promote the growth of the industry and the distribution
of the product as well as the idea that a single firm in an area was the best
provider, the so-called "regulatory compact" between government and utilities
was formed.
In brief, the regulatory compact moved the electric industry from an unreg-
ulated industry that was moving toward monopoly to a regulated monopoly. A
utility was given an exclusive service area and assumed an obligation to serve
all persons in that area. The government would set the rates that the monopoly
could charge and would allow (as opposed to "guarantee") the utility to earn a
reasonable return on its prudent capital investment. The traditional rate formula
allowing such returns can be seen as cost plus contracts. As long as a utility
behaves prudently, it earns a reasonable return on its capital investment' For
24. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25. The New Deal moved the country from the Lochner Era to the activist state. See HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw 1836-1937 105-204 (1991). Concerning the revolutionary di-
mensions of the change compare BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS chs. 5 & 6 (1991) and
MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL OR-
THODOXY ch. 8 (1992) with BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKWG THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1997) and WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULA-
TION IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICAN (1996).
26. ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (1995).
27. Formal definitions can be found in: I ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCI-
PLES AND INSTITUTIONS 11-12; II Kahn at 2-3 (MIT Press) (1988); STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM 15-19 (Harvard University Press) (1982); W. Kip VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E.
HARRNOTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTrRUST 76-87 (2nd ed. 1995).
28. Monopoly power has the effect of raising prices, reducing output, and causing losses of consumer
surplus. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 2, at 189-191.
29. See, eg., SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 2, at 196-206; Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC,
810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 33:827
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years, the regulatory compact made utility investments safe ones. As long as the
national economy was expanding, the demand for energy was increasing pre-
dictably, and economies of scale were continuing to be realized, utility invest-
ments were protected.
This period, from 1935 to 1965, has been called the "golden age" of the
electric industry.' For privately owned, vertically integrated utilities ("IOUs"),
economies of scale continued as the size of generation units grew. Growth and
demand for electricity also grew steadily, doubling every ten years at a rate of
roughly seven percent annually. Continued technological advances, together
with reliable and predictable growth, caused the average cost of production to
stay relatively flat for a period of time. This meant that consumers saw their
rates rise slightly or not at all. Public Utility Commission (PUC") hearings
were non-controversial and the PUC's had little work to do aside from the
occasional rate decrease. Utilities were content because they continued to grow
and earn more money. Shareholders were pleased because their stock portfolios
were stable. Consumers were subdued because their rates were modest or de-
clining. And regulators were content because there were no political costs asso-
ciated with their activities. Once technological advances flattened, this compla-
cency changed.
D. Regulatory Failure: 1965-1996
The regulatory compact, establishing a government protected monopoly
operating essentially under a cost plus rate formula, works well in an expanding
economy with accompanying technological advances. Under such circumstanc-
es, industry growth occurs while prices stabilize or fall. However, when econo-
mies of scale and technological advances flatten, the cost of doing business in-
creases. An increased cost of doing business can have negative effects on any
business. It can have disastrous effects on a regulated business whose activities
are constrained because of those regulations.
In economic terms, starting approximately in 1965, the marginal costs for a
utility began to exceed its average costs resulting in a profitability squeeze.
30. HYMAN, supra note 1, at 119-130.
31. The history of electric industry rates can be roughly graphed. Traditionally, rates were based on
historic average cost rather than on marginal costs.
INS Q
Prior to 1965, utilities were delighted with this form of ratemaking because when MC < AC, and last year's
1998]
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This economic situation is disastrous for a regulated firm whose earnings are
calculated on prudently incurred historic costs. The traditional rate formula is
based on historic (average) costs. As a firm continues to take advantage of
economies of scale, its average costs decline and the firm can expand its capital
investment, thus earning a reasonable rate of return on that investment. Howev-
er, increasing marginal costs mean lower profits for utilities; and those profits
will continue to decline until rates are set at marginal cost.' One consequence
of the traditional rate formula encouraging capital investment was plant expan-
sion because returns were calculated on capital investment. Unfortunately, just
as microeconomic theory predicts, increased costs bring higher prices and high-
er prices mean declining demand. In other words, the traditional rate formula
contributed to excess capacity as utilities over-invested in new plants, especially
nuclear power plants.33
During this period, utilities, with the rest of the economy, faced inflation,
rising labor costs, the collapse of the nuclear power industry and the OPEC and
Iranian Oil Embargoes3 4 These economic indicators put great pressure on
utilities to raise prices at unprecedented rates, causing rate shock among con-
sumers and dramatic political repercussions in state regulatory commissions.'
Rising prices also revealed that there was more price elasticity of demand for
electricity than previously assumed. As utilities overexpanded and tried to cap-
ture their high fixed costs, electricity rates rose and consumers, contrary to
expectations, consumed less electricity than predicted.3
The "energy crisis" of the 1970's held some surprises for everyone includ-
ing the electric industry. Such is the law of unintended consequences that, what
started as a conservation measure in the "moral equivalent of war"'37 had the
result of creating a new electricity market. In response to foreign oil embargoes,
the Carter Administration initiated a series of legislative initiatives known as the
National Energy Act of 1978. This legislation was intended to promote conser-
vation, lessen dependence on foreign oil, and develop alternative energy sourc-
es. One of the key pieces of legislation was the Public Utility Regulatory Poli-
costs form the basis of this year's rates, then a utility's profits are maximized because of declining average
and declining marginal costs. Thus, average cost ratemaking meant healthy profits for utilities. When MC >
AC, however, and ratemaking continued to be based on average costs, then profitability declined and cash
flows were constricted because it cost more to produce the next units of electricity but rates were based on
the preceding year's lower costs.
32. See, eg., In re Madison Gas & Electric Co., 5 P.U.R. 4th 28 (1974).
33. Harvey Avereh & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM.
ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).
34. JOSEPH P. TOMAiN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION (1987).
35. Public utility commissions, once non-controversial, safe places for public servants, became highly
politicized as utilities, regulators, and consumers confronted unprecedented rate increases. See WILLIAM T.
GORMLEY, JR., THE PoLrrlcs OF PUBLIC UTnTY REGULATION (1983).
36. TOMAIN, supra note 34, at 82-86; FERC Staff, Office of Economic Policy, Regulating Independent
Power Producers: A Policy Analysis, in COMPETITION IN ELECTRICITY 361, 368-69 (James L. Plummer &
Susan Troppmann eds., 1990).
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cies Act ("PURPA")' which encouraged small electric power production and
cogeneration as conservation measures.39 These small sources of generation
were known as qualifying facilities ("QF's") and PURPA was more successful
than people imagined. Not only did QF's conserve power, QF's also became
new (and cheaper) generation sources. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (' FERC") further assisted the development of new generation sources by
requiring that local public utilities buy excess power generated by QF's at the
"full avoided cost."
The local utility, in other words, had to connect with cogenerators and
small power producers and purchase any excess electricity generated by the QF
at the utility's "full avoided cost" which was the utility's marginal cost of elec-
tricity. Utilities which had over-expanded their facilities had to buy competitor's
electricity not at the prevailing market value, but at the utility's own higher cost
of producing electricity. Needless to say, new producers found this market
attractive.
If you are an entrepreneur selling a low cost product to a guaranteed pur-
chaser, what do you do other than produce as much of that lower cost product
as possible? PURPA, unintentionally, tapped into this new generation market.
It should be apparent that the stage for competition was then set. Tradition-
al, rate-regulated utilities followed the rules, earned favorable, stable returns but
overbuilt. The overbuilds raised the utilities' fixed costs. These utilities needed
to recover their fixed costs but consumers balked for two reasons. First, in
many instances consumers were asked to pay for capital expenditures that gen-
erated no electricity.4" Consumers did not want to pay something for nothing.
Second, consumers, especially large industrial, full-switchable firms, saw the
availability of cheaper electricity and they wanted to purchase that product. The
question then became: How do consumers get to the cheaper electricity? Non-
utility generators (NUGs) of various sorts,' including QFs, were perceived as
being able to generate electricity at a lower cost than traditional public utilities.
Consequently, consumers wanted to take advantage of new sources of cheaper
electricity and free market advocates of deregulation thought this was a good
idea.
E. ReregulationlDeregulation: 1996 - Present
The Reagan/Bush Era was hailed, to some extent erroneously, as an era of
deregulation. In fact, many deregulation initiatives involving traditionally regu-
38. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (1994).
39. 16 U.S.C. §824a-3 (1994); 16 U.S.C. 824j (1994).
40. See American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Electric Power Service Corp., 461 U.S. 402 (1983).
41. See Tomain supra note 34; Richard J. Pierce, The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect:
Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 505(1984); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,
488 U.S. 299 (1989) (upholding a state law which prohibited a utility from including certain capital expendi-
tures in its rate base).
42. A non-utility generator is a non-traditional utility generating electricity for wholesale. See Matlock,
supra note 7; Glossary in TH1E ELECrRIC INDUSTRY, supra note 7, at 14-12.
1998]
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lated industries such as railroads, motor carriers, natural gas, electricity, and
airlines, began during the Carter Administration. Still, the mood was ripe for
deregulation initiatives in both the electric and gas industries, as well as others,
because there were cheaper sources of both products to be had. In the electricity
and natural gas industries, two problems loomed large. The first is known as the
transportation bottleneck, which exists in both industries. The second problem is
uncompensated regulatory costs.
Most public utilities, including gas and electric, are vertically integrated
and privately owned. A utility generates, transports, and distributes its product.
In the electric industry, it was becoming increasingly clear that new sources of
generation existed. Nevertheless, there were limited numbers of power lines for
electricity transportation as there were limited numbers of natural gas pipelines.
In fact, both transportation systems still had natural monopoly characteristics
and there was no evidence of competition for the transportation segment while
new generators were entering the market. There was no apparent reason for new
transmission systems to be constructed. Consequently, the privately owned
transmission lines, if left to the competitive marketplace, would witness private-
ly owned utilities favoring its own generators and would set higher prices for
the transmission of competitor's electricity. The issue was how to open access
to the transmission segment in a pro-competition environment.
The second problem facing electric and gas public utilities concerned ex-
penditures made in reliance on regulatory requirements. Traditional utilities
built more plants because the rate formula encouraged and their service obliga-
tion required them to do so. The extra plants, however, were too costly. Who,
then, should pay? Shareholders who prudently invested? Or ratepayers who
were receiving no electricity? This is the problem of "stranded costs."'43
How did consumers get to the cheaper sources of electricity, particularly
given the historic regulatory compact that encouraged utilities to invest in capi-
tal expansion?
Conceptually, the problem facing the electric industry was simple. Allow
customers access to transmission systems, so that the cheaper sources of supply
could get to consumers. In this way competition is promoted and prices should
decline. Needless to say, an industry that had been heavily regulated for over 60
years found the access idea hard to accept because capital investments had to be
recovered and transmissions systems were privately owned by vertically inte-
grated utilities. In other words, the government would be hard pressed to justify
taking privately owned transmission systems and making access available to
consumers. Nevertheless, as the political rhetoric changed from deregulating the
electric industry to restructuring it, consumers' demand for access grew loud
enough for regulators to hear. It only remained for regulators to do two things.
First, develop a system of open access to transmission systems and second, to
deal with those costs incurred under traditional utility regulation. These prob-
43. See, e.g., Willaim J. Baumol & Gregory Sidak, TRANSMISSION PRICING AND STRANDED COSTS IN
THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (1995).
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lems of wheeling and stranded costs, respectively, are issues that currently
confront federal and state regulators and are the subject of new federal, and
state legislation.
F. Reprise
Note that this brief regulatory history takes us through the regulatory life
cycle at roughly thirty year intervals. Before the turn of the century, technologi-
cal innovation placed a new product on the market. Consumer demand was high
and the product was seen to be of high public interest. Competition was vigor-
ous and private markets tended toward consolidation which had the undesirable
effect of restricting access to that product. Once consumer and shareholder
abuses were recognized, government stepped in to remove those restrictions as
well as to promote the development of the product.
This last point is a significant one. Government regulation is most often
not undertaken to constrain economic activity as much as it is to promote the
use of private property. The threats of concentration and monopoly in the elec-
tricity industry were enough to provoke government intervention to make elec-
tricity universally available.
Government regulation proved to be a temporary fix. The traditional rate
formula encouraged and rewarded expansion just as it prevented monopoly rent-
seeking. This formula worked best while the economy was expanding and the
utilities were realizing positive scale economies. When average costs began to
increase, especially when marginal costs exceeded average costs, the traditional
formula became a disaster. Regulators cannot mimic the market no matter how
hard they try. With ratemaking in the electricity industry, after a period of time
regulators effectively overpriced the product and encouraged overproduction.
Traditional regulation eventually caught up to regulators as consumers
demanded access to newer and cheaper sources. The same phenomena occurred
in the natural gas, airline, and telephone industries where incumbents enjoyed
the fruits of regulation. The challenge in each industry, and for deregulation
generally, is to open the industry to new entrants without injuring incumbents
who relied on existing regulatory schemes while furthering the public interest.
At this point, it may very well be the case that the new electricity industry will
go through a thirty year period of major and significant restructuring. The keys
to that restructuring must address wholesale and retail wheeling and the prob-
lem of regulatory assets or stranded costs.
Ill. THE NEw ELECrRICrTY INDUSTRY
A. Federal Regulation and Wholesale Wheeling
The electric industry, like the natural gas industry, has a bottleneck prob-
lem. In both industries, producers and consumers are separated by a transmis-
sion system displaying monopoly characteristics. Thus, the electric industry has
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the natural gas industry to look to for useful analogies in addressing transmis-
sion access problems.4
The natural gas industry, as a result of similar economic forces and chang-
es in energy markets, found itself with cheap supplies which consumers de-
manded. The industry also found itself constrained in getting those supplies to
customers because of existing regulations. As energy supplies constricted during
the 1960's and 1970's, a dual natural gas market developed. The less regulated
intrastate market allowed natural gas prices to rise along with world prices.
However, the federally regulated interstate market priced natural gas on historic
average costs; therefore keeping prices well below the world market, which
priced gas according to consumer demand. Consequently, a natural gas shortage
occurred because domestic producers, subject to FERC jurisdiction, were pre-
vented from raising prices to the world level while consumers demanded more
gas at the lower domestic price, thus giving rise to a natural gas shortage.'
Natural gas producers had three strategies available to them: sell gas in the
intrastate market, withhold supplies from the interstate market until market
conditions or government regulations changed, or attempt to contract around the
problem by entering into mutually advantageous contracts with pipelines.
The first two strategies were not successful. Federal regulators were very
reluctant to let federally dedicated gas producers abandon the interstate market
and enter the higher priced intrastate market.' And, withholding gas from the
market is not profitable.
Contractual arrangements between producers and pipelines, however, were
promising. Pipelines played two roles in the natural gas industry. As buyers,
pipelines bought and sold gas to customers in bundled transactions. As trans-
porters, pipelines transported gas in unbundled transactions to customers who
purchased gas from producers. As a result of the shortage, in order to secure a
source of supply, pipelines would enter into long-term "take-or-pay" contracts
with producers for specific volumes of gas.47 In other words, pipelines agreed
to pay for a certain amount of gas regardless if they used it.
As long as prices remained at the contract level, everyone was satisfied.
Producers could rely on cash flow to continue exploration and production. Pipe-
lines could satisfy their customers and consumers received gas. When the ener-
gy crisis subsided, artificially high natural gas prices because of foreign oil
cartel activities, inevitably fell unleashing a new array of market forces. More
44. See, e.g., JAMES MCGREW, GAS DAILEY'S GUIDE TO FERC's REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS
(1997); S. Lawrence Paulson, Gas Restructuring: Can Distributors Repeat the Success of Pipelines?, 135 PUB.
UTIL. FORT. 20 (1997).
45. STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COM-
MISSION (1974); ARLON R. TUSSING & CONNIE C. BARLOW, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION,
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMICS (1984); M. ELIZABETH SANDERS, THE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS: POLICY
AND POLntCs, 1938-78 (1981).
46. See California et al. v. Southland Royalty Co. et al., 436 U.S. 519 (1978); see also United Gas Pipe-
line Co. v. McCombs et al., 442 U.S. 529 (1979).
47. See Jonathan D. Schneider et al., Natural Gas Transportation, 3 Energy Law & Transactions § 83.03
[1]; James McManus, Natural Gas, 2 Energy Law & Transactions § 50.04[1][d (David J. Muchow & Wil-
liam A. Mogel eds., 1996).
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specifically, consumers wanted lower priced gas; producers wanted to get more
gas to the market and avoid take-or-pay obligations; and, pipelines wanted to
transport and sell new gas and rely on existing contractual obligations.
The culprit behind these new market problems was the dual natural gas
market which created artificial shortages and economic distortions. While it was
in the gas industry's interest to eliminate that market, producers and pipelines
had committed capital under the old regime and had entered into long-term
contractual relations. Federal regulators began to unify the dual markets by
deregulating natural gas prices.' Immediately following the shortage, in the
era commonly known as the Gas Bubble Era, the FERC tried to force the rene-
gotiation of contracts between producers and pipelines and to force the
unbundling of services between sales of natural gas and its transportation
through interstate pipelines.49
The solution was essentially simple-move more gas to consumers. How-
ever, the existing regulatory structure gave the FERC little authority over forc-
ing pipelines and producers to renegotiate.50 More to the point, actors in the
natural gas industry relied on those regulations in establishing business and
contractual relationships. Consequently, producers needed to recoup their costs
and wanted to enjoy the benefits of their contractual relationship.
The electricity industry had similar experiences. In reliance on the tradi-
tional rate formula, IOU's invested in generation capacity based on the historic
experience of escalating demand and in response to a reward system, which
gave utilities a return on their investment for capital expended for generation.
Once electricity prices rose and as demand fell, utilities found they had over-
spent capital on generation and they had excess generation plant capacity. The
overspending and excess capacity, particularly on nuclear power, were signals
that electricity could be produced at lower costs. Again, like the natural gas
industry, consumers wanted access to lower cost electricity but were prevented
from getting it because of the existing regulatory scheme.
Not only can electric industry policymakers view the history of natural gas
regulation in this country, there are international lessons to be learned as well.
Electricity restructuring is happening in Europe, most notably Britain, Norway,
Sweden, and Denmark. The foreign restructuring involves many of the issues
faced by the domestic industry, such as vertical divestiture, power pools, new
producers, and privatization.51 It may be too early to judge the success or out-
come of those experiences, though one writer suggests that electricity prices did
not decrease as predicted and that regulation has expanded to address new com-
48. Natural Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301 (1994).
49. Order No. 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 15 C.F.R. pts.
2, 157, 250, 284, 375, 381 (1985); Order No. 500, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead
Decontrol, 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 284 (1987); Order No. 636, Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regu-
lations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation; and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial
Wellhead Decontrol, 18 C.F.R. pt. 284 (1992).
50. Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
51. EUROPEAN ELECrrcrrY SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLICY AND REG-
ULATION IN WESTERN EUROPE(Atle Midttun ed., 1997).
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petitive problems such as reintegration and consolidation occur. 2
The FERC now, after having experience on the natural gas side of its
docket, moved to the electricity side and began open access to the electricity
transmission system through an arrangement known as wheeling.53 Wheeling
is the practice of a generating utility using another utility's transmission lines to
move electricity to consumers. Under the old Federal Power Act, the FERC had
the authority over transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the
sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. Voluntary intercon-
nections for wheeling were allowed under the Federal Power Act and the FPA
had limited authority to order interconnections, but rarely used that authority.54
PURPA expanded the FERC's interconnection authority slightly. Under
section 210, in response to the energy crisis and as an attempt to promote con-
servation and alternative uses of energy, PURPA created a regulatory category
of "qualifying facilities" ("QF's") which were small power producers and co-
generation units, not greater that 80 MW.' The QF's were originally seen as
alternatives to larger electricity generation that would capture small amounts of
electricity that might otherwise be wasted, thus also promoting conservation.
As it turned out, QF's opened the door to today's new competitive market
in electricity. That door was unlocked, as noted earlier, with a regulatory key
requiring the local public utility to purchase any excess electricity that the QF
would generate at the local utility's cost of generating its own electricity. This
became known as the full-avoided cost.56 In order to make these required pur-
chases, the FERC could order the connection of QF's to the local public utili-
ty.7
QF's were wildly popular and an unpredictable success as the government
began creating a new market. There were 1200 QF's by 1993 which constituted
10% of new generation.58 Thus, the economic hunch that cheaper electricity
was available turned out to be true. Yet the problem still remained of getting
that cheaper electricity to the consumers who demanded it.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992"9 ("EPAct") further vitalized the emerging
electricity market by exempting certain generation from the holding company
requirements, thus stimulating more production.' Then EPAct allowed the
52. John E. Kowka, Jr. Transforming Power. Lessons from British Electricity Restructuring, REOULA-
lION (Summer 1997).
53. See especially, Rules and Regulations, Order No. 636, Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to
Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transportation; and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After
Partial Wellhead Decontrol, F.E.R.C. STATS. & REGS. ( 130,939 (1992), 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (1992).
54. Matlock, supra note 7, at 2-8 to 2-9.
55. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1994).
56. American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 421-23 (1983);
THOMAS E. MARK, PURPA and the Regulation of Alternative Energy Sources, 4 ENERGY LAW & TRANSAC-
TIONS § 130.02[1] (David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel eds., 1996).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 824j (1994).
58. See Sheila S. Hollis, The Changing Scene: An Overview of Recent Developments in the Electric
Regulatory Arena in The Electric Industry.
59. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992) [hereinafter EPACT]; RICH-
ARD D. AVIL, JR. & EDWARD B. MYERS, Energy Policy Act of 1992 in 3 ENERGY LAW & TRANSACTIONS
§ 58-0811] (David J. Muchow & William A. Mogel eds., 1996).
60. Exempt Wholesale Generators (EWG)-the term "exempt wholesale generator" means any person
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FERC the authority to order a transmitting utility to provide transmitting servic-
es. EPAct, however, prohibited the FERC from ordering retail wheeling and
limited its authority to wholesale wheeling.
In response to the limited wholesale wheeling authority of the EPAct of
1992, FERC passed Order No. 888.6'
The FERC based its authority for Order No. 888, on the finding that new
generation capacity was available at lower prices, as PURPA and other actors
had already demonstrated. FERC also found that non-traditional utility genera-
tors (' NUGs") were competitive and that consumers were demanding access to
these new generators.
Order No. 888 has multiple goals, most importantly obtaining efficiency
through competitively priced generation.62 The structure of the demand side of
the industry is such that large industrial users have more bargaining power with
their local utilities, or with other utilities, because large users have more options
for their source of power. For example, an industrial consumer can consume
electricity, generate its own, or use an alternative fuel more easily than can a
residential consumer. Consequently, large users can, with greater ease, make
demands on utilities for lower rates than smaller users. Thus, while bargain
based market transactions make sense for large users in an effort to promote
economic efficiency, such bargains are not readily available to smaller users.
Other goals of Order No. 888 include ensuring reliability, as well as nondis-
crimination in access and transmission rates for all users. Finally, Order No.
888 addresses the issue of stranded costs. Utilities who now must provide ac-
cess over their transmission lines to other generators and users may find them-
selves losing energy sales from their generation units as a result of a decrease
in market share. Those generation units, however, were constructed in reliance
on the traditional scheme of regulation. Thus, to avoid companies being unable
to recoup the cost of these units, care must be taken in authorizing access over
an IOU's transmission lines.
It follows that Order No. 888, involves a system of mandatory open access
and functional unbundling of a utility's vertically integrated electricity products.
As a result of Order No. 888, the FERC believes that there should be $3.8 to
$5.4 billion worth of savings each year. The FERC also believes that new mar-
ket mechanisms should evolve to facilitate technical innovation in the genera-
tion and transmission of electricity and reduce rate distortion.
Wholesale wheeling partially restructures the industry by setting in motion
a set of regulations that enable multiple generators to either pool their electricity
or to enter into bilateral contracts with purchasers. The pooled electricity or
determined by the Federal Energy Regulation Commission to be engaged directly or indirectly through one or
more affiliates as defined in section 79B(a)(ll)(B) of this title, and exclusively in the business of owning or
operating, or both owning and operating, all or part of one or more eligible facilities and selling electric ener-
gy at wholesale. 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a (1994).
61. 75 F.E.RC. 1 61,080; F.E.R.C. STATS. & REGS. 31,036; 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996).
62. Matlock, supra note 7, at 2-23; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT SECTION OF
PUBLIC UTILITY, COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION LAW 137-40 (1997).
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contract electricity will then be moved over a distribution system. The issues
that remain to be addressed involve the structure and ownership of new trans-
mission systems, which involves state regulators; they will be addressed below.
B. Retail Wheeling
The federally allowed wheeling at the wholesale level is only half of the
picture of industry restructuring. Wholesale wheeling opens up transmission
across interstate lines and among interstate utilities, but does not reach retail
customers. The EPAct prohibition on retail wheeling was based on the tradition-
al view that wholesale electricity in interstate commerce were subject to federal
jurisdiction while retail sales were subject to state regulation. If intrastate cus-
tomers wanted to have access to cheaper electricity, then wheeling would have
to be allowed at the state, retail level but to date federal law does permit such
open access.
Like wholesale wheeling, retail wheeling involves the unbundling of ser-
vices. In addition, state law may involve the divestiture of an IOU's assets such
as separating generation from transmission services. This separation would
allow a customer can purchase transmission or distribution services from one
utility and generation services from another and other ancillary services, e.g.
load control, from yet another. However, as with wholesale wheeling, the prob-
lem at the retail level goes back to the regulatory compact.
Vertically integrated utilities relied on the traditional regulatory scheme
and subjected themselves to regulatory rate setting and mandatory service obli-
gations in exchange for exclusive territories. Once services are unbundled, how-
ever, some capital investments made in reliance of the regulatory scheme may
not be able to earn a rate of return. Earlier it was noted that IOU's overbuilt
generation in reliance on the traditional regulatory compact. Some IOU's trans-
mission facilities, as well, may be under utilized and new transmission facilities
may not be needed.
Regarding electricity industry restructuring, all eyes are on California be-
cause of the issuance of its famous "Blue Book" issued in 1994 to restructure
the industry by creating a new electricity market which is scheduled to begin on
January 1, 1998. California's Blue Book created an independent system operator
('ISO") to allow both pool-based transactions and bilateral trading.63 Pool-
based transactions are those in which the ISO operator serves a coordinator who
monitors generation committed by multiple suppliers of electricity into the
pool."' The ISO then dispatches it to customers. Bilateral trading occurs with
negotiations between customers and generators and the transmission occurs over
63. See Laurie M. Rodgers & Joseph F. Schuler, Jr., Ready, Fire, Aim: California and the Nation on the
Eve of Competition, 136 Pub. Util. Fort. 26 (January 1, 1998); William W. Hogan, Rethinking WEPEX:
What's Wrong with Least Cost?, 136 Pub. Util. Fort. 46 (January 1, 1998). See also Leonard S. Hyman &
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the ISO lines.' The dilemma between whether or not to operate the ISO as a
pool or as a marketplace for bilateral trades again raises issues of market power.
Clearly, large end users will have more leeway to bargain than smaller users
with less market power. Consequently, a transmission system operator must pay
attention to the nature and balance of the types of transmission transactions
allowed in the system. Too many bilateral trades may adversely affect smaller
users.
Retail wheeling involves a wide array of legal and policy issues including
legal issues such as end use customers right to choose suppliers and the right of
access to the pool by competitors in unbundling services and prices. Policy
issues include: What is a state to do about universal service? Should wheeling
be available to all customers? Are there environmental issues involved with
wheeling and more competition?'  And, how quickly and in what manner
should retail wheeling policies emerge?
Retail wheeling also involves operational issues, such as reliability, divesti-
ture, and the role of the transmission system operators. Would they be govern-
ment run or privately run? In other words, who should administer retail wheel-
ing systems? And finally, what to do about stranded costs?
C. Stranded Costs68
The central problem in any economy is correctly predicting the future so
that a firm can stay financially viable. Financial prediction is more complicated
in a mixed economy in which signals are sent both by the market and by the
government. There is, however, some mitigation for a firm who faithfully fol-
lows governmental signals. In certain instances, government cannot change the
rules of the game without compensating a firm for financial injuries incurred in
reliance on those rules. Regulated firms are restricted from earning marketplace
profits and in exchange are provided some financial protection. Under tradition-
al price regulation, for example, an electric utility was prohibited from earning
monopoly rents but could earn a reasonable rate of return on all prudently in-
vested capital. Stranded costs may well be the type of assets that are afforded
similar protection. Utilities invested capital in reliance on a regulatory scheme,
then the regulations changed. The perplexing question involves the extent to
which those regulatory assets are recoverable.
One of the first difficulties involved in this issue is defining stranded costs
at all. The estimates for stranded costs vary from $100 billion to $200 bil-
65. See id.
66. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Public Service Electric & Gas Co., & Mid-Atlantic Energy
Project, Benchmaking Air Emissions of Electric Utility Generations in the Eastern United States (last modified
April 1997) <http'./www.nrde.org/nrdcpro/ util/index.htnl>.
67. See James Barker, Jr., et al., Regulation of Power Pools and System Operators: An International
Comparison, 18 ENERGY LJ. 261 (1997).
68. See Sheila S. Holis & Mary Ann Rails, STRANDED COSTS: THE NEXT GREAT ENERGY BATTLE IN
THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. . REV. 851 (1996).
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lion.' What did regulators learn, if anything, from take-or-pay contracts in the
natural gas industry? Does the stranded cost problem involve the equitable
sharing between ratepayers and shareholders? Will stranded costs be dealt with
similar to cancelled nuclear plants? Are stranded costs those that were prudently
incurred or those that were used and useful?7 How will investors respond to
a system with or without stranded costs recovery? Will stranded cost recovery
displace the efficiency gains to be realized in the new electricity market?7 Can
stranded costs be recovered from departing customers with an exit fee? What
legislative and financial arrangements can be made to protect stranded assets?n
The stranded cost problem presents difficult and complex economic choic-
es. It also presents difficult and complex policy problems. As the electric indus-
try restructures, there will be a propensity for producers to put the cheapest
electricity they can generate on the market first. For generators that use a fuel
mix, they are more likely to put electricity generated by coal or natural gas or
hydropower on the market before they market nuclear-generated electricity.
Consequently, those utilities with a relatively high percentage of energy pro-
duced from nuclear plants will end up a more stranded plant than others.73 As
an aside, the choice of use of fuels presents certain environmental difficulties as
well.74
These questions, and more, are those being asked by industry actors, regu-
lators, consumers, shareholders, investment advisors, and scholars.75 In brief,
these are policy questions. Some concern economic efficiency, while others
involve precedent and fairness. Decision-makers will balance the economic and
political pros and cons regarding stranded costs and make some apportion-
ment.76 Little more can be said about the precise contours of that apportion-
ment as state and federal regulators and legislatures wrestle with this multi-
billion dollar problem.
69. Hollis, supra note 58, at 12-2; ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ELECTRICITY PRICES IN A
COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT: MARGINAL COST PRICING OF GENERATION SERVICES AND FINANCIAL STATUS
OF ELECTRIC UTILIrIE-A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS THROUGH 2015, ix (August, 1997); J. Gregory Sidak &
Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract 8-9 and n. 9 and n. 29 (1997).
70. See Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see generally JO-
SEPH P.TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION (1987).
71. The Energy Information Administration predicts modest to no price reduction. ENERGY INFORMA-
TION ADMINISTRATION, ELECTRICITY PRICES IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT: MARGINAL COST PRICING OF
GENERATION SERVICES AND FINANCIAL STATUS OF ELECTRIC UTILITIEs-A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
THROUGH 2015, xi-xvi (August, 1997).
72. See Kenneth Rose, Securitization of Uneconomic Costs: Whom Does It Secure?, 135 Pub. Util. Fort.
32 (1997). FERC has ruled that you cannot recoup stranded costs through higher transmission fees. Cajun
Electric Power Corp v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
73. See Margaret Kriz, Fuel Fight, NATIONAL JOURNAL 1126 (1997).
74. See id.
75. See William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Transmission Pricing and Stranded Costs in the Electric
Power Industry (1995); Sidak & Spulber, supra note 66; J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory
Takings and the Regulatory Contract (1997); Glenn D. Meyers, et al., Stranded Utilities: How Demographics,
Not Managements, Caused High Costs and Rates, 135 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 18 (1997); Steven Isser & Robert
Michaels, Stranded Investment: Utility Estimates or Investor Expectations?, 135 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 26 (1997).
76. Retail stranded costs may be picked up through FERC jurisdictional rates if a state fails to act. The
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The electric industry may be undergoing its most exciting period in sixty
years. We have already witnessed a spate of mergers and acquisitions and the
occasional disallowance.7 The industry also will experience the formation of
new companies as unbundling becomes more prevalent.78 There will be
Genco's, Transco's, Gridco's Disco's, Poolco's, as well as the emergence of
regional transmission grids ('CRTGs").
Activity on Capitol Hill will be toward deregulation through the elimina-
tion of PURPA and PUHCA restrictions, as well as the introduction of federal
legislation to mandate wheeling and promote the sale of "green power."
79
V. CONCLUSION
The electric industry has been presented as an illustrative case study in
government regulation. While we are justly proud of living in a capitalist de-
mocracy with its faith in the free market, the reality is much more subtle and
complex.
Markets do not exist without government. There is no clean division be-
tween "The Market" and "Government Regulation." Rather, ours is a mixed
economy, as are most economies, and the political rhetoric contrasting govern-
ments and markets is really about matters of degree, not differences in kind.'
The trick for any government involvement with the economy, of course, is to
honor demands for both efficiency and fairness." Thus, the regulatory state
and those industries, such as the electric industry, under its jurisdiction, are
affected by the winds of the political marketplace as much as by those of the
economic marketplace.
The story told abbve is not chaotic. The pendulum of regulation swings
roughly every generation, sometimes toward more government regulation and
sometimes toward more market ordering. The electric industry is not unique in
77. See Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, The FERC"s Policy on Electric Mergers: A Bit of Perspective, 15
ENERGY L. 113, 116 (1997); Order No. 592, Inquiry Concerning the FERC's Merger Policy Under the
Federal Power Act, 77 F.E.RC. 9161,263, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,595 (1996).
78. J. Robert Malko, Assessing Corporate Restructuring in the Electric Industry: A Framework, Address
at the ABA Section on Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental Law 10th Annual Conference on Elec-
tricity Law and Regulation, tbl. C (February 1997); Joris M. Hogan, Disaggregation and Beyond: Indenture,
Corporate, Securities and Business Issues in Successful Restructuring, Address at the ABA Section on Natural
Resources, Energy and Environmental Law 10th Annual Conference on Electricity Law and Regulation, thl. F
(February 1997).
79. See Margaret Kriz, Fuel Fight, 29 NAT'L J. 1126 (June 7, 1997); Electricity Competition Act of
1996, S. 1526, 104th Cong. (retail competition by 2010; full recovery by utilities of prudently incurred retail
stranded costs); Electric Power Competition Act of 1996, H.R. 2929, 104th Cong. (1996) (overhaul the
PUCHA, the FPA, and the PURPA); Electric Power Competition and Consumer Act of 1996, H.R. 3782,
104th Cong. (1996); Electric Consumers Power to Choose Act of 1996, H.R. 3790, 104th Cong. (1996) (open
access for all retail customers by the year 2000; Section 210 of PURPA and PUHCA repealed); Consumers
Electric Power Act of 1996, H.R. 4297, 104th Cong. (1996) (open retail access by January 1, 1998; Section
210 of PURPA and PUHCA repealed; prohibit recovery of stranded costs through direct or indirect subsidies
or exit fees).
80. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
(1977).
81. See ARTHUR OKUN, EQUALrIY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADE OFF (1975).
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this regard. Similar stories can be told for broadcast television, cable television,
long distance and local telephone services, airlines, railroads, trucking, and
banking. Each of these traditionally regulated industries have gone through
similar experiences. Each was regulated "in the public interest." Each regulatory
scheme was challenged by market forces, and each is experiencing regulatory
change regardless of whether it is called deregulation, reregulation, regulatory
reform, or restructuring.
Now, if the past is a prologue, then the question may fairly be asked: What
does the regulatory future of the electric industry look like? I can suggest two
trends for the future, neither of which is particularly controversial nor all that
revolutionary.
Clearly, traditional regulation has either served its purpose or has failed to
meet its objectives, depending on one's political slant. Consequently, the heavy
hand of government regulation will be lessened and market-based incentives
and mechanisms will be substituted. Put another way, traditional regulation will
be supplanted by more market-oriented regulation rather than complete deregu-
lation. Regulators will reduce their involvement with classic ratemaking and
promote a more competitive electric industry. Those forces are already operat-
ing and will continue to move forward.
The second prediction is also a modest one. Electric industry restructuring
will not go all the way to complete deregulation. Rather, we are experiencing a
dramatic change in regulatory structure. Regulatory problems persist however.
Earlier, we spoke about how to compute and allocate stranded costs. Liability is
a serious issue as independent system operators or pools are formed and as
demand is made on those pools, how will the system respond when it becomes
congested? Do customers pay a congestion fee as a flak fee or will consumers
pay a flat fee or a fee based on marginal cost?82
Competition in the electric industry will generate new products, new fims,
new services and new entrants. Traditional IOUs will increase the unbundling
of their services, marketers and aggregators will appear, electricity futures will
be traded, and privately owned completely unregulated companies will be sell-
ing electricity. Also, the "virtual utility," that is a services firm with no tradi-
tional capital utility assets, is a real possibility. As a result of this greater com-
petition, industry expansion will continue for a time and the stronger, most
efficient finns will consolidate as global competition in energy increases. Ulti-
mately concentration will occur. Once that concentration threatens industry
actors and threatens consumer interests, then the pendulum will swing back
toward more intensive government regulation. How long will that period of
competition, expansion, and concentration last? About a generation.
82. See Cliff Rochlin & Roger Clayton, Electric Transmission: A West Coast View: The Case of Flow.
Based Access Fees, 135 PuB. UTIL. FoRT. 46 (1997); Samuel C. Thomas, Electric Transmission: An East
Coast View: The Right Price for PJM, 135 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 40 (1997); Joseph F. Schuler, Jr., Electric Indus-
try Issues Forum: Reliability, Transmission, and Competition, 135 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 45 (1997).
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